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.*These notes are based on the expository lectures given at the Indian Institute of
Management, Calcutta, in August, 2001.  Part I covers the first two lectures.  Part II will cover
the third lecture.  The last lecture was based on my paper with Rabi Bhattacharya which
subsequently appeared in the Review of Economic Design, vol. 6, 2001 (pp. 133-153).  I would









In assessing the impressive development of the Walrasian equilibrium theory from the
1950s, a number of themes were stressed by the leading researchers.  To begin with, let us recall
Arrow and Hahn (1971):
“There are two basic, incompletely separable aspects of the notion of general
equilibrium...: the simple notion of determinateness, that the relations describing the economic
system must be sufficiently complete to determine the values of its variables, and the more
specific notion that each relation represents a balance of forces.  The last, usually, though not
always, is taken to mean that a violation of any relation sets in motion forces tending to restore
it”.
We are thus led to two questions of interest: namely, the existence of a Walrasian
equilibrium, and its stability.  Both of these questions were recognized in many of the earlier
landmarks in economic theory.  For example, in his Value and Capital, Hicks carefully pointed
out that if the price system in the model of general equilibrium of exchange is such as to achieve
the equality of demand and supply in each market, we have a “position of equilibrium.  If not,
some prices will be bid up or down” and went on to assert that “the determinateness...was
ensured by equality between the number of equations and the number of unknowns” as shown by
Walras [see Hicks (1939,  p. 89) and the mathematical appendix on p. 314].  Samuelson 
(1947) provided the mathematical formulation of the Walrasian tatonnement process and its
stability, and a definitive treatment of the topic came from Arrow, Hurwicz and Block (1958,
1959).  A few remarks on the “stability” question will be made later.  I shall begin with the
question of “determinateness” and see the link between this and the celebrated “fixed point”3
theorems of mathematics.  Two other questions were also studied: uniqueness of equilibrium and
comparative statics.  Efforts to identify conditions under which there is a unique Walrasian
equilibrium eventually led to the recognition that the property holds only 
“under strong assumptions and...economies with multiple equilibria must be allowed for.  Such
economies will seem to provide a satisfactory explanation of equilibrium as well as a
satisfactory foundation for the study of stability provided that all the equilibria of the economy
are locally unique.  But if the set of equilibria is compact (a common situation) local uniqueness
is equivalent to finiteness.  One is thus led to investigate conditions under which an economy has
a finite set of equilibria”. [Debreu (1970)]
One of the most influential contributions of Debreu was to point out that such finiteness
is “typical” in a precise sense (it holds generically over a class of models).
Some of the difficulties in deriving comparative statics results are discussed in Arrow
and Hahn (1971), and, are also suggested by a line of research initiated by Sonnenschein, and a
remarkable theorem of Debreu (1972).  But the techniques introduced in Debreu (1970, 1972)
are quite different from those we use in these lectures.
 In his assessment of the development of general equilibrium analysis, Koopmans (1957,
p. 60) noted: 
“Our authors have abandoned demand and supply functions as tools of analysis, even as applied
to individuals.  The emphasis is entirely on the existence of some set of compatible optimizing
choices.  This question can be answered without making assumptions that cause unique choices
to be associated with any prevailing prices, a precondition for the definition of single-valued
demand and supply functions.  The problem is no longer conceived as that of proving that a
certain set of equations has a solution.  It has been reformulated as one of proving that a number4
of maximizations of individual goals under interdependent constraints can be simultaneously
carried out.”
Keeping these observations in mind, I shall introduce the celebrated Debreu-Gale-Nikaido
lemma on set-valued mappings, which is proved by using the Kakutani fixed point theorem. 
Next, we look at the remarkable result of Uzawa (1962) which shows that this lemma implies the
Brouwer fixed point theorem.  A model of an exchange economy [similar to the one developed
in Nikaido (1956)] is elaborated next, and the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium is proved by
appealing to the Debreu-Gale Nikaido lemma.
The discussion in Section 1 and 2 emphasizes the close link between the problems of
existence of a competitive equilibrium and a fixed point theorem.  In Section 3 I sketch another
equilibrium concept that has assumed a privileged position outside the Walrasian paradigm.  The
Cournot-Nash equilibrium is a foundation stone of game theory, and an elegant theorem on the
existence of such an equilibrium is proved by using Kakutani's fixed point theorem.
Yet another theme in this literature was the role of prices in coordinating individual
decisions based on self-interest and arriving at a socially optimal allocation of resources. While
Adam Smith’s invisible hand is usually regarded as a starting point, the literature on optimality
of competitive equilibrium was also enriched by the remarkable contributions of Arrow and
Debreu, and later provided useful insights into the problems of mechanism design and incentive
compatibility studied rigorously by Leonid Hurwicz.  In Section 4, I shall sketch the fundamental
theorems of new welfare economics.  In this context, let us note the following remarks of
Koopmans:




The emphasis is shifted to the specification of conditions under which decentralization of
economic decisions through a price system is compatible with efficient utilization of resources”.
The “new” tools that Koopmans alluded to included the famous separation theorems for
convex sets.  The problem of characterizing Pareto optimality and linking it to competitive
equilibrium was attacked by Samuelson, Lange and others by using the techniques of calculus. 
It is still useful to keep in mind the “first order conditions” characterizing Pareto optimality.  But
the set theoretic arguments are often more general.
0.1 Notation
In what follows, for any two vectors a = (ak), b = (bk) in úR, we write
For any vector a = (ak), write
and




(written a $ 0) if ak $ 0 for all k, and ak > 0 for some k; a is strictly positive (written a >> 0) if 
ak > 0 for all k.  Write S = {x , RR    x   0}.
1.  A Model with Excess Demand Functions
As a first step, let us recall the celebrated:
Theorem 1.1.  Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem.  
Let X be a non-empty compact convex set in R
n, and f : X 6 X be a continuous mapping. 
Then f has a fixed point  (satisfying  
There are R-commodities in the economy.  The set of admissible price vectors is given by
A continuous function z : P 6 RR is an excess demand function if
The relation (WL) is the well-known Walras Law which is often derived from other assumptions
when one introduces economic agents explicitly (see, the discussion below in the context of
exchange economy, and Debreu (1959) for a more general model with consumers and
producers).
An element p






Take a continuous function M(p) on P with úR such that
(example: Mk(p) = max (- pk, zk(p)))
Now define a mapping T from P into P as follows:
where [see (0.2)]   .
First, verify that T is well-defined by noting that for any p , P, *p + M(p)* > 0.  If
 for some  in P, then by (1.5),   for       
all k = 1,2,...,R.  But    implies that    for some k'.  For each k' with 
 so that    for all such k'.  This means that    for all
such k'.  Hence,  .  This violates (WL).
Clearly the mapping T defined in (1.6) is continuous.  By Brouwer's fixed point theorem
there is some p







where    .
Now, from (WL) and (1.8) 
But zk(p
*)Mk(p
*) $ 0     for all k [use (1.3) - (1.5)].  Hence    implies
This implies that
To summarize our discussion, let us state formally
Theorem 1.2.  Existence of an Equilibrium
Assume that the excess demand function z is continuous on P and satisfies (WL).  Then
there is some p
* such that z(p
*) .
Continuity of z on the compact set P implies that there is some constant M’ such that
*z(p)* # M’ for all p , P.  In particular, even when the price of some commodity k equals zero,
the excess demand for each commodity remains bounded.  This assumption is problematic if
more of some commodity is always preferred to less, and the consumers attempt to maximize
utility.  A more satisfactory approach is to define z to be continuous at any p in P such that 9
(2.1)
p >> 0, and to impose an appropriate boundary condition [see Arrow-Hahn (1971, Chapter 2) or
Debreu (1970) for such results].
2.  A Model of an Exchange Economy
In a number of contexts, the Debreu-Gale-Nikaido Lemma is the key step in proving the
existence of a Walrasian equilibrium.
Lemma 2.1.  The Debreu-Gale-Nikaido Lemma.  
Let Z be a compact subset of RR.  If . is an upper semicontinuous correspondence from P
into Z such that for every p in P, the set .(p) is (nonempty) convex and satisfies p.(P)   0, then
there is p
* in P such that .(p
*) 1 (- S) is nonempty.
Proof.  It is easy to verify that P is (non-empty) compact and convex.  Replace Z by a compact,
convex subset Z' of RR which contains it.  As P is nonempty, so clearly is Z, hence Z'.
Given z in Z', let :(z) be the set of p in P which maximize p.z on P.  Since P is non-
empty, compact, :(z) is nonempty, and the correspondence : from Z' to P is upper
semicontinuous on Z' (by the maximum theorem).  Since P is convex, so is :(z) for either 
(i) z = 0, and then :(z) = P or (ii), z … 0 and then :(z) is the intersection of two convex sets: P
and the set {p , RR : p.z = Max P.z}.
Consider now the correspondence N from P × Z' into itself defined by
The set P × Z', a subset of R
2R, is non-empty, compact, convex since P and Z' are.  The10
(2.2)
(2.3)
correspondence N is upper semicontinuous since : and . are.  Finally, for all (p,z) in P × Z', the
set N(p,z) is (non-empty and) convex, since both :(z) and .(p).  Hence, all the conditions of







*), which is equivalent to
The first relation in (2.2) implies that for every p in P, one has p
* z
*    pz
*.  The second implies
that p* z*    0.  Hence, for every p in P, one has
Taking the point p of P defined by pK = 1, pK' = 0 for k' … k, one obtains (from (2.3))    
Hence, z
* , - S.  This, with z
* , .(p
*), proves that p
* has the desired property.
Q.E.D.
We shall now prove the striking result of Uzawa (1962) that links the Debreu-Gale-
Nikaido Lemma to the fixed point theorem of Brouwer. 
Theorem 2.1 Uzawa’s Theorem.  
The Debreu-Gale-Nikaido Lemma implies Brouwer's fixed point theorem.
Proof.  It suffices to prove that Debreu-Gale-Nikaido Lemma implies that any continuous
function f from P into itself has a fixed point [see, e.g., Nikaido (1968, Chapter 1, Theorems 2.7







2 > 0 for all p in P.  Noting this fact, define for p in P, 
and define R single-valued functions
Writing .(p) = (.k(p)) we obtain a continuous mapping from P into P.  Since P is compact, there
is a compact subset Z in RR that contains .(p) for all p in P.  Since .(p) consists of a single point,
it is surely true that (viewed as a correspondence) .(p) is convex.  Continuity of the function
.(p) means that - again viewed as a correspondence - .(p) is an upper semicontinuous
correspondence.  Now,
Hence, by using the Debreu-Gale-Nikaido Lemma we get the existence of some p





The last step in the proof is to show that 8(p
*) = 1 and that equality holds in (2.9).  Note first that
the validity of (2.7) implies that (2.9) must hold with equality for any k such that     On
the other hand, (2.9) implies that     if     Using (2.4) we get fk(p
*) = 0 if 
  Hence, equality holds in (2.9) for all k = 1,...,R, i.e.,
Now, summing over k and using (2.4) we get 8(p
*) = 1.  Hence,
so that p
* is a fixed point of the mapping f.  
Q.E.D.
2.2.  A Decentralized Exchange Economy
To get an example of the application of the Debreu-Gale-Nikaido lemma, let us quickly
review the model of a decentralized exchange economy similar to that of Nikaido (1956).  This13
pioneering work has been interpreted as a rigorous presentation of a substantial literature on the
“neo-classical” theory of international trade.  In his masterly survey, Chipman (1965) introduced
this theme as follows:
“What is generally considered to be the “neo-classical” theory of international values
actually consists of at least two separate strands that have been gradually woven together.  One
is the Marshallian apparatus of the reciprocal demand curve (or “offer curve” as it is now
usually called).  The other strand consists of what appears to be a spontaneous development on
the part of different writers writing (in many cases) independently of one another in the early
1930's....  The diagrammatic technique introduced by these writers was finally perfected by
Meade, and the model was given mathematical rigor by Nikaido (1956, 1957).”
Consider a model of an exchange economy with m agents (indexed by i) and R
commodities (indexed by k).  I shall refer to the agents as consumers, but they can be interpreted
as countries.  Each agent i is characterized by its preferences    and its endowment vector Ti. 
We assume that:
(A.1) Ti >> 0    for all i
Note that this assumption is particularly problematic when the agent is identified as a
country.  It can be weakened, however, at the cost of considerable technical difficulties (see
Nikaido (1957)).
(A.2)  defined on S is reflexive, transitive and complete.
(A.3) For any y , S, and for each i=1,2,...,m, the sets {x , S : x    y} and {x , S : y }
are closed.14
Given (A.2) and (A.3), for each agent i, there is a continuous utility function ui : S 6 R
representing the preferences  , i.e., there is a continuous function ui : S 6 R such that
I shall now introduce convexity properties of preferences.  In the following statements, x
2
and x
1 are different points of S, and 8 is a real number in (0,1).
(A.4) weak convexity: if x
2    then 8 x
2 + (1-8)x
1  
This property (P.1) is equivalent to:
(A.4') For every     in S, the set {x , S : x    is convex.
(A.4") For every   in S, the set {x , S : x    is convex.
It is useful to take a minute and look at the implications.  First, we prove that (A.4')
implies (A.4).  Let    then  .  Also,  ; hence, 
  By (A.4'), for any 8 , (0,1),     Next, (A.4)
implies (A.4").  Let x
2 and x
1 , {x , S : x    Suppose x
2     Then by (A.4), for 
8 , [0,1], 8 x
2 + (1-8)x
1     This establishes the convexity property (A.4").  A
similar argument applies if x
1     Finally, we show that (A.4") implies (A.4').  Let x
1, x
2 ,
{x , S :   .  If (A.4') is not valid, then there is some    such that x' ™i
  But, then, by transitivity,    and 
  By (A.4"),    a contradiction.




When    satisfies (A.2), i.e., the preferences are continuous, (A.5) implies (A.4).  We








1] = {x,S : x = 8x
2 + (1-8)x
1, 8, [0,1]}.  We
want to conclude that if (A.5) holds, the set
is empty.  It cannot consist of a single point, since its complement in [x
2, x
1] is the set 
{x , [x
2, x
1] :   which is closed.  Therefore, if the set (2.11) is nonempty, it must
contain two distinct points say  .  
_______________
x
1                   x
2
However,  implies that [by (A.5)]    Moreover,    implies that
 This leads to a contradiction.
(A.4) is consistent with “thick” indifference curves; (A.5) rules this out.
A Walrasian equilibrium consists of commodity bundles    and a price system
p in P such that
(")
($) For each agent i,    is a solution to the following optimization problem:
The first condition (") requires that for each commodity, excess demand is non-positive.  The
second condition ($) requires that for all i,    maximizes the utility of agent i on its budget set  16
 determined by the price system p
*.
The competitive system is regarded as a canonical model of a decentralized resource
allocation mechanism, and the equilibrium price system coordinates individual decisions made in
the pursuit of individual interest.  In equilibrium, one can think of the following verification
scenario [paraphrased from Hurwicz (1986)] as an interpretation of the model: the agents are
presented (say, on a display board) with a proposed message (consisting of an allocation (xi)
satisfying    and a price system p
*).  The ith agent says “yes” if and only if xi is an
equilibrium for him or her (i.e., xi maximizes ui on the budget set {c , S : pc  
determined by the proposed p).  Note that this “yes” is based on calculations involving the
characteristics (Ti, ui) of the i-th agent alone, and the price system p that is common knowledge). 
If all the agents say “yes” the message is an equilibrium message for the organization.  If there is
any “no”, an alternative message must be proposed.
The difficulty of formally designing a system of proposing alternative messages if the
initial message is not an equilibrium has turned out to be formidable, particularly when one
demands ‘decentralization’ in some sense.  Even when the initial proposal is an equilibrium, one
is entitled to ask how the redistribution of the initial endowment pattern (T1,...,Tm) is achieved in
a decentralized manner.  Exploring this direction leads us to a better appreciation of the role of
‘money’ as a medium of exchange.
To prove the existence of equilibrium, we show that when (A.5) holds, under the
condition ("), the condition ($) can be replaced by




Thus, in   we introduce an (ad hoc) constraint in terms of an upper bound on the choice of c. 
To show that [under (")], the conditions ($) and    are equivalent, it is trivial to see that  
satisfying ($) necessarily satisfies  .  To go in the other direction, write 
.  Suppose that    satisfies    but ($) does NOT hold (for some
agent i).  Then there is c
* , S, p
*c
*     Surely, c
*   ó   .   Now, 
 For any 8 , [0,1], we have:
and
By the convexity assumption (A.5), for all 8 , [0,1)
Hence, for 8 sufficiently close to 1,  and this contradicts  






Clearly Bi(p) is a (nonempty) compact, convex subset of  .  We want to prove that
Let p
n , P converge to some p , P, and c
n , Bi(p
n) converge to c, then c , ;  and,
implies, in the limit, that
Hence, c , Bi(p).  This establishes the upper-semicontinuity of the correspondence Bi.  To
establish the lower semicontinuity of Bi, let p
n , P converge to p , P and c , Bi(p).  One must
construct a sequence c
n , Bi(p
n) such that c
n converges to c.
Two cases need to be considered.  
Case I.  Suppose that pc < pTi.  Then there is some n0 such that for all n $ n0, p
nc < pTi. 
Hence, c , Bi(p
n) for all n $ n0.  Now, choose the sequence c
n as follows: for all n < n0, c
n is an
arbitrary element of Bi(p
n); for all n $ n0, c
n = c.  Clearly, c




Case II.  Suppose that pc = pTi.  Since Ti >> 0, pTi > 0.  Hence there is some   , S,
such that19
(2.19)
Hence, there is some n0 such that for all n $ n0,
Consider the point a
n where the line joining  to c intersects {z:p
nz = p
nTi}.  For all n $ n0, a
n
exists, is unique and tends to c.  The c
n is chosen as follows: for n < n0, c
n is an arbitrary element
of Bi(p
n); for n $ n0, choose c
n = a
n.  This establishes the lower semicontinuity of Bi(p), and
completes the proof of (2.16).
For any p , P, consider now the following optimization problem for agent i:
Since ui is assumed to be continuous, Weierstrass’ theorem ensures the existence of a solution to
(2.19).  Let Ni(p) be the set of solutions to (2.19).  By (A.5), Ni(p) is convex.  By the maximum
theorem, Ni(p) is an upper semicontiuous correspondence on P.  Define
Then .i(p) is the excess demand correspondence of agent i which is upper semicontinuous on P
and is convex-valued.  Also, if x , .i(p), then x = y - Ti where y , Ni(p).  Hence    so
that  .  Define20
Then, .(p) is an upper semicontinuous correspondence on P with values in the set 
 is convex for each p and if z , .(p),     By using the
Debreu-Gale-Nikaido lemma, there is some p
* , P, and    such that
This implies that    where    such that
Hence, we get  , and    satisfies    hence ($).  To summarize: under the
assumptions (A.1), (A.2), (A.3) and (A.5), there exists an equilibrium in the exchange economy.
3.  Cournot-Nash Equilibrium
While the Walrasian equilibrium focuses on the role of prices in coordinating self-
seeking actions of a ‘large’ number of ‘small’ agents, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium concept
captures the possibility of direct interaction among a ‘small’ number of agents.  As in the case of
the Debreu-Gale-Nikaido lemma, a proof of the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium can be
obtained by the use of Kakutani’s fixed point theorem.
I shall sketch a general model due to Debreu (1952).  Consider an abstract social system 
(Ai Ni, ui)i,M  described as follows: there are m agents; write M = {1,2,...,i,...m} and 
M-i = {1,2, i-1, i+1,...,m}.  The i-th agent must choose an element ai in the Ai of his a priori
available actions.  The sets Ai are assumed to be nonempty, compact, convex sets of Euclidean
spaces.  When the agents other than the i-th choose actions am-1 / (a,...,ai-1, ai+1,...,am), the choice21
(3.1)
of the i-th agent is restricted to a nonempty subset of Ai, depending on aM-1.  Formally, we define
a correspondence Ni from    to Ai that associataes with the generic element a =
(a1,...,am) of A, the nonempty subset Ni(a) of Ai to which the choice of agent i must be restricted. 
The set Ni(a) is actually independent of the i-th component of a, but it is more convenient (from
the technical point of view) to define it formally on A, rather than on  .  The
correspondence Ni is assumed to be continuous and convex-valued.  
The utility function (or the return function) ui : A 6 R specifying the utility to agent i
resulting from a = (a1,...,ai,...,am) (the m-tuple of actions) is assumed to be continuous and quasi-
concave in ai.
Let aM-i be the (m-1)-tuple of actions of the set M-i of agents (excepting agent i); the i-th
agent chooses ai so as to maximize ui(•,aM-i) on Ni(a) (again, it should be stressed that Ni(a)
depends only on aM-i).  Thus, the i-th agent chooses an element of the set
By the Weierstrass' theorem, :i(a) is nonempty, and by quasi-concavity of ui, :i(a) is convex-
valued.
An element a
* of A is an equilibrium if for every i g M,  maximizes ui(•,  on
Ni(a
*), i.e., if for every i g M, 
Thus, if the correspondence : is defined from A into A by22
the element a
* of A is an equilibrium if and only if a
* g :(a
*), i.e., if and only if a
* is a fixed point
of the correspondence :.
The basic existence theorem on Cournot-Nash equilibrium is now stated:
Theorem 3.1.  Cournot-Nash Equilibrium
If for each i Ai is a nonempty, compact, convex subset of a Euclidean space, :i is a
continuous, real-valued function on   which is quasi-concave in the i-th variable and
Ni is a continuous, convex-valued correspondence from A to Ai, then the social system 
(Ai, ui, Ni)i0M  has a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Proof:
First, by using the maximum theorem, show that :i is upper-semi-continuous.  Moreover,
for every a in A, :i(a) is convex, since it is the intersection of two convex sets Ni(a) and {xgAi :
ui(x, aM-i)  .  The set A is nonempty, compact, convex.  The correspondence :
is (nonempty) upper-semicontinuous and convex valued, from A into A.  Hence, by Katutani’s
theorem, : has a fixed point. Q.E.D.
4.  Pareto Optimality
Let us go back to an economy without production and without any specification of
ownerships of endowments: an economy E now consists of m individuals, each characterized by
a preference preordering   and a total resource vector 




(x1,...,xm) such that 
An allocation    is said to dominate another allocation    strongly if
We shall say that    dominates    weakly if
and
It is clear that if    dominates    strongly,    also dominates    weakly.  It is an exercise to
identify monotonicity and continuity properties of the preferences    such that weak
domination implies strong domination.
An allocation    is said to be Pareto optimal if there is no other allocation 
 such that    dominates    weakly.  An allocation  is said to be weakly Pareto
optimal if there is no other allocation    such that    dominates    strongly.
We now introduce the concept of a valuation equilibrium relative to a price system p
* > 0






* > 0 if for each i,
In other words, an allocation    [satisfying (4.1)] is a valuation equilibrium p
*
if any consumption vector x that the agent i prefers to    costs more at the price system p
*.  We
can now state and prove:
Theorem 4.1.  
If    is a valuation equilibrium at the price system p
* > 0, it is weakly Pareto
optimal.
Proof.  Suppose that    is not weakly Pareto optimal; then there is some allocation    that
Pareto dominates    strongly.  This means that, for all i,
Since    is a valuation equilibrium relative to p
*, we have:
Now, summing over all i,






We have a contradiction between (4.7) and (4.9).
The argument above needs a minor extension to arrive at a stronger conclusion with an
additional assumption.  A consumption vector x ,  is locally nonsatiated for a consumer i, if
every neighborhood Nx,g, (g > 0)) of x contains some y such that y ™i x.  Here, for any g > 0
We now have:
Theorem 4.2 The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics
Suppose    is a valuation equilibrium relative to p
* > 0, and, for every i,   is locally
non-satiated.  Then    is Pareto optimal.






Consider, first, the nonempty set of agents for whom (4.12) is satisfied.  We follow the
arguments of Theorem 4.1 to establish that for each such agent i,
Now, consider the (possibly empty) set of agents for whom (4.11) hold, but (4.12) does not. 
This means that for all these agents
We shall show that for each of these agents
If not, suppose that   .  Then, since    is locally nonsatiated, there is some y such
that y ™   and    (write out the details) and this contradicts (4.4).






and we have a contradiction.
It should be stressed that this ‘first’ fundamental theorem does not appeal to convexity
(this statement continues to hold even when we introduce production).  The weaker version
(Theorem 4.1) does not impose any non-satiation or monotonicity condition on preferences
either.
We now turn to the second fundamental theorem.  A commodity vector y , S is not a
satiation consumption for agent i if there is some z , S such that z ™i y.
Theorem 4.3. The Second Fundamental Theorem
Suppose that the preferences    of all agents satisfy (A.2), (A.3) and (A.4). 
Furthermore, there is some agent   who satisfies the monotonicity condition:
Let    be a Pareto optimal allocation.  Then there is p





Proof: Name the agents so that the first agent satisfies the monotonicity property (4.19).  Write
Note that by (A.4), all the sets    are convex.  Of course,    is nonempty.  Define
Clearly, S is convex.  Next, we verify that S cannot contain any   >> 0.  Suppose it does.  Then
there are bundles (xi), i=1,...,m, x1 ,  xi , Mi (i=2,...,m) such that
Now, define y1 = x1 +    ™1 x1 and yi = xi = (i=2,...,m).  Then we have:
and, y1 ™1 x1 ™1 ,  yi    for i=2,...,m.  Thus,   = (yi) is an allocation that Pareto dominates 
 weakly, a contradiction.
By a separation theorem (see, Appendix), there is p






This means that for any    one has
Now, if x1 , M1, note that x1 +    ,    for all   >> 0.  Hence, for any (x1,...,xm) such that 
xi , Mi, i=1,...,m, one continues to have
But    so that, for any (x1,...,xm) with xi , Mi,
or, for any (x1,...,xm) such that xi , Mi,
Now consider any particular agent i, and let    i.e., x , Mi.  Set xj =  
for all j … i, and use (4.26) to conclude
This establishes (4.20) Q.E.D.30
It is useful to amplify (4.20) a bit and relate it to the concept of a valuation equilibrium
(4.4).  Note that (4.20) does NOT preclude the possibility that for some agent i, there is some y ,
S, y ™i  AND p
*y = p
*
However, assume that at the price system p
* > 0 - whose existence we asserted by
appealing to a separation theorem - p
*  > 0 for all i.  This assumption clearly holds if 
 for all i (i.e., if the Pareto optimal allocation we are considering is an ‘interior’
allocation).
In this situation if (4.20) holds, but (4.4) does not, we get a contradiction.  If for some i,
(4.4) does not hold, then there is y , S, y ™i  and p
*y = p
*  By (A.2), {z , S : z ™i  is




*  and we have a contradiction.31
Appendix
In what follows, S is a subset T of R
m and T is a compact subset of R
n.  A
correspondence N from S into T is a rule that associates with each x in S, a nonempty subset
N(x) of T.  The correspondence N is upper semicontinuous at x
0 if:
"for every sequence x
n converging to x
0, and every sequence y
n , N(x
n) converging to y
0"
it follows that "y
o , N(x
0)".  
The correspondence is lower semicontinuous at x
0 if:
"for every sequence x
n converging to x
0, and every y
0 , N(x
0), there is a sequence 
y
n , N(x
n) such that y
n converges to y
0."
The correspondence N is continuous at x
0 if it is upper and lower semicontinuous at x
0.  The
correspondence N is upper (lower) semicontinuous (continuous) on S if it is upper (lower)
semicontinuous (continuous) at every x , S.
Now, consider a continuous real valued function f on S × T.  Let N be a continuous
correspondence from S into T.  Fix x , S, and consider the function f(x,y) on N(x) [i.e. with x
fixed, vary y over N(x)].  Let  .  Since N is upper semicontinuous, and T is
compact, one can show that N(x) is compact.  By continuity of f, M is well-defined.  Write
A.1 The Maximum Theorem
The correspondence : is upper semicontinuous.  
We also have the celebrated:32
A.2 Kautani Fixed Point Theorem
Let S be a nonempty, compact, convex subset of R
m, and N be an upper semicontinuous
correspondence from S to S such that for all x , S, N(x) is (nonempty) convex.  Then, there is
some x , S such that x , N(x).
R.2.  Separation Theorem
Let X be a convex set in RR containing no strictly positive vector u >> 0.  Then there is a
semipositive p $ 0 such that px  for all x , X.
Proof: See Nikaido (1968, Theorem 3.5).33
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